Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 13

Issue 4

Article 2

1925

The Pardon Power
Orie S. Ware

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Ware, Orie S. (1925) "The Pardon Power," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 13: Iss. 4, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol13/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

THE PARDON POWER
A discussion of the origin, control and legal effect of the
pardon, which in our system of government holds a well defined
place in the executive branch, is, of course, particularly of interest to those engaged in the enforcement of the criminal and
penal laws against the execution of which it relieves.
Lord Coke says of the pardon that it is "a work of mercy
whereby the king, either before or after attainder, conviction or
sentence, forgiveth any offense, punishment or execution." 1
Chief Justice Marshall defines it as "An act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws
which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed." 2
The pardoning power may be traced to the earliest writers
as the prerogative of the sovereign authority, and while it is said
by some theorists of the law that "pardons should be excluded
in a perfect legislation where punishments are mild, but certain,"
yet the power has existed from time immemorial, and is regarded as an act of grace and mercy; and "a pardon, where
properly granted, is also an act of justice supported by a wise
public policy."
Writing on Pardons, Blaekstone says of the King: "To him
the people look as the fountain of bounty and grace and these
acts of goodness, coming immediately from his own hand, endear
the sovereign to his subjects, and contribute more than anything
to root in their hearts that filial affection and personal loyalty
which are the sure establishment of a prince." Hence, forgiveness is the principle by which public policy justifies the delegation of this power and it should be based upon such considerations of mercy and justice as the circumstances of each case permit, and always "repentance should precede pardon."
The Constitution of the United States provides that the
President "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." 3 The power is unlimited, except in impeachment, and
extends to every known offense, and may be exercised at any
time after the commission of the offense, either before or during
13 Inst. 233.
2 United States

820.

'Art. 2, See. 2.

v. Wilson, 7 Peters 150; George v. LIAZard, 106 Ky.
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trial, or after conviction or judgment. It is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon,
nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. This prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive can not be fettered
by any legislative restrictions. 4
. The power has long been exercised by the king of that nation, whose jurisprudence and judicial institutions have furnished the basis *of our own principles respecting the operation
and effect of a pardon, and form the foundation for the main
body of our laws.
The limitation in cases of impeachment found in the Federal Constitution and also in each of the four constitutions of
our own state originated in the Statute 12 and 13 William III, C.
2, which states "that no pardon under the great seal should
be pleaded in bar of an impeachment by the House of Commons." This act was the result of a controversy which terminated in a dissolution of Parliament and arose out of the impeachment of the Earl of Danby in 1678, who presented the
king's pardon as a plea in bar to the proceedings in the House
of Commons. But with this limitation, it is given as an unquestioned prerogative of the crown to pardon all offenses, which
include treasons, felonies and misdemeanors. This doctrine laid
down by the English authorities,, as a royal prerogative, limited
only in impeachment by the act of William III, is contained in
Federal Constitution and has received the same construction.
Our State Constitutions have limited the pardoning power
to a further extent. The first Constitution of Kentucky adopted
April 19, 1792, by Article 2, See. 10, referring to the powers of
the governor, provided "he shall have power to remit fines and
forfeitures, and grant reprieves and pardons, except in cases
of impreachment; in cases of treason, he shall have power to
grant reprieves until the end of the next session of the General
Assembly in whom the power of pardoning shall be vested." By
Articles 3, See. 2, of our second Constitution, adopted August 7,
1799, we find the exact language of the first Constitution. In
our third Constitution, adopted June 11, 1850, by Article 3, See.
10, the same language formed the basis of the pardon power,
with the addition of these significant words, "but he shall have
4

Bx Parte Gar~and, 4 Wallace 333.
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no power to remit the fees of the clerk, sheriff or Commonwealth's Attorney in penal or criminal cases."
Our present Constitution, adopted September 28, 1891, by
section 77, provides: "He shall have power to remit fines and
forfeitures, commute sentences, grant reprieves and pardons,
except in cases of impeachment, and he shall file with each application therefor a statement of the reasons for his decision
thereon, which application and statement shall always be open
to public inspection. In cases of treason he shall have power
to grant reprieves until the end of the next session of the General Assembly, in which the power of'pardoning shall be vested;
but he shall have no power to remit the fees of the clerk, sheriff
or Commonwealth's attorney in penal or criminal cases."
In this, as in most states, executive clemency in cases of
treason is limited to a reprieve until the end of the next General Assembly in which the pardon power is vested. By section
66 the sole power of impeachment is vested in the house of representatives and a judgment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold office. By section
240 of the Constitution the governor shall not, within five years,
pardon any person who shall have participated in a duel. With
these limitations, the pardon power of the executive is unlimited and exclusively his prerogative. It may be exercised as
to all other offenses in an unlimited manner, before or after conviction. 5 The power is by the organic law vested in the governor,
and there can be no legislative or judicial restriction in its exercise. It is a prerogative completely and exclusively in his
province.
It is not my purpose to extend this article beyond the questions of the effect of a pardon, the right of revocation and the
power of the courts to set aside for fraud and misrepresentation.
The effect of a pardon is well stated by Justice Fields of the
United States Supreme Court, viz.: "It releases the offender
-from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores to him
all his civil rights. In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the
offense, that afterwards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent
the assertion of his legal rights. It gives to him a new credit
and capacity,' and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former
position. But it does not make amends for the past. It af5 Commonwea7th v. Duval, 2 Duval o.Ky.) 264.
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fords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender in his
person by imprisonment, forced labor, or otherwise; it does not
give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor does
it impose upon the government any obligation to give it.'"'
The general acceptance of these principles is too well settled for further comment, except to observe that in our own state
a pardon after judgment relieves the convict of the punishment,
but does not invalidate the judgment of conviction; and such
a judgment may be used as a basis for the increased penalty of
7
a second offense under our habitual criminal act.
Where it is undertaken to impeach the credibility of a witness by showing he has been convicted of a felony, it seems that
it is not competent to show he has been pardoned.8
It is well settled that the court will not take judicial notice
of the existence of a pardon, and to be available it must be
brought to the attention of the court to stay proceedings or execution of the judgment, but no formal plea is necessary. 9
An unconditional pardon cannot be revoked by the executive granting it. The authorities, without any conflict, deny to
the executive any such power. As said in the case of Knapp v.
Thomas, infra, "It would not only be contrary to principle that
the governor should be vested with such authority, but the power
itself would be of the most dangerous and pernicious character.
Great evils would inevitably flow, in ways that may be readily
suggested, from the exercise of any such power; and hence,
wisely, no such power exists." The written instrument having
been executed and delivered cannot be revoked by the governor
after the fraud is discovered.1 0 The law is settled that when a
pardon is complete, there is no power to revoke it, any. more
than there is power to revoke any other completed act. And it
is doubtful, except statute authorize it, if summary arrest may
follow the violation of a conditional pardon; but the accused
'Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 442.
v. Commonwealth, 2 Duvall 93; Herndon v. Commonwealth,
105 Ky.
200; Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779.
8
Martin v. Uommonwealth, 25 Ky. L. IL 1930.
OPowers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 400, 20 R. C. L. 580, Sec. 70;
United States v. Wilson, 7 Peters 158.
10Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 379 (1883); Rathburn v. Batme,
191 N. W. 297, 30 A. R. L. 219 (Iowa, 1922); State v. N'ichols, 26 Arkan.sas 74; Ex Parte Reno, 66, Mo. 266; Ex Parte Redwine, 91 Tex. C. R.
83; 236 S. W. 96 (1922); Ex Parte Ray, 193 Pac. 635 (1920).
7 MoUnt
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will be entitled to a trial in a court of competent jurisdiction to
determine the breach of the condition."
That a pardon may be set aside by the courts for fraud and
misrepresentation is sustained by the great weight of authority.
At the common law any suppression of truth or suggestion of
falsehood in procuring a pardon will vitiate it, for the king
was misinformed; or when it may reasonably be presumed the
king is deceived, the pardon is void.' 2 The same thing is said,
in general terms, with respect to charters, patents, grants and
judgments, that anything obtained by fraud is void, and that
"covin doth suffocate the right."' 3
Chitty in his work on Criminal Law, 14 says: "It is also a
general rule that whenever it may reasonably be inferred that
the king, when he granted the pardon, was not fully apprised of
the heinousness of the offense or how far the defendant stood
committed on the record, the pardon is altogether void."
'Wharton, in his work on Criminal Procedure, 15 says: "A
pardon fraudulently procured will, it has been held, be treated
by the courts as void. And this fraud may be by suppression
of the truth as well as by direct affirmation of falsehood. Yet
this test should be cautiously applied by the courts, for there are
few applications for pardon in which some suppression or falsification may not be detected. It is natural that it should be so,
when we view the condition of persons languishing in prison, or
under sentence of death; and if departure from rigid accuracy
in appealing for pardon be a reason for canceling a pardon,
there would be scarcely a single pardon that would stand. The
proper course is to permit fraud to be set up to vacate a pardon
only when it reaches the extent in which it would be admissible
to vacate a judgment."
A review of the early decisions in the United States strongly
confirms this power in the courts. In the case of Dominick v.
Bowdoin,16 decided in 1871, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the
defendant, as sheriff, held the petitioner under a bench warrant,
and the prisoner answered by producing a pardon from the govUAZvarey v. State, 50 Florida 287.
122 Hawkins P. C. 382; 4 Blackstone 400.
Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 388.
114Vol. 'I, page 771.
"Vol. II, page 1469.
1144 Ga. 357.
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ernor, and the issue of fraud was raised. The court said:
"When, by suggestion of fraud in its procurement, the question of its validity is put in issue, or where the identity of the
person pardoned, or the fact of its acceptance or delivery, are
brought before the court, in such eases, if, upon habeas corpus,
it is the duty of the court to hear the testimony and pass tpon
the merits of the particular case, or, if pleaded upon the trial,
then to hear evidence, and let the jury pass upon the case under
the proof. For, while we hold the constitutional power exists in
the executive to grant pardons, we also hold that fraud in their
We need not mulprocurement will render them void. . .
tiply cases, as enough has been quoted to show the fact that
fraud will render the pardon void. We find no settled rule of
practice or law laid down, nor do we intend to lay down more
than the recognition of the general rule stated. As to what
would or would not amount to fraud, or sufficient fraud to render
it void, we deduce from the general rule of decisions, that misrepreseitation of the facts material in the case upon which the
governor acted, and which ought to have prevented the clemency
of the governor, if known, or any concealment of the material
facts of the case, or suggestion of false views to the Governor
to procure the pardon, ought to be adjudged in the particular
case by the court or jury, as the issue may be joined."
The case of State v. McTntireyT decided in 1853, arose on a
conditional pardon relieving the imprisonment on express condition that all fines and costs incident to the judgment be first
paid by the defendant. As a matter of fact, no fine was imposed
by the judgment, and the pardon upon its face showed the governor was misinformed because there was a condition precedent
which was impossible of performance, and the condition itself
was contradicted by the record, as the governor evidently supposed the defendant had been both fined and imprisoned, and intended to remit the imprisonment provided the fine be paid, but
it will be observed that such use was made of the pardon as to
escape both. The court said: "If the condition precedent be impossible, no interest shall grow thereupon" as a common rule of
law, and further: "That the law, which declares a pardon obtained under such circumstances to be void, is one of the many
1746 N. C. 1.
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instances showing the truth of the maxim 'the common law is
the perfection of reason.' "
In State v. Leake,' 5 decided in 1854, the governor remitted
the sum of $1,500.00 to the sureties on a recognizance providing
for the appearance of one charged with an offense, and in an
action for a recovery on the recognizance, the sureties pleaded
the governor's remission thereof, and to this the state replied
that the remission was obtained by fraud in that the defendant
had indemnified them for the whole sum with an agreement that
he would flee the country and never appear for trial, which
facts were concealed from the governor. Under these circumstances the court held the pardon to be void, and the court said:
"It is well settled in the British courts that fraud vitiates a
pardon or remission, and so it is in the American. But how
this fraud must appear is, perhaps, not so clearly determined.
It is insisted that it cannot be pleaded, and established by extriusic evidence; that is, evidence not furnished by the record
of the suit in which the pardon or remission is granted. This
point we shall not examine in deciding the case before us. The
authorities and text books all concur in this: That whenever it
may reasonably be inferred from the contents of the pardon or
remission itself, considered in connection with the record of the
cause in which it was granted, that the executive was deceived
or imposed upon by false statements, or an omission to state
relevant facts, on the part of those procuring the pardon or remission, the one or the other, as the case may be, is void. Coke,
in his 3rd Institutes, 19 says: "And that party which informeth
not the king truly, is not worthy of his grace and forgiveness,
and therefore either suppressio veri or expressio falsi doth avoid
the pardon."
In the case of the Commonwelath v. HaZloway,20 decided in
1863, the governor granted a pardon to a notorious forger,
named Crosse, which was based upon communications to the
governor and the United States marshall of Pennsylvania from
the assistant secretary of war requesting the release of the forger
for the purpose of a secret mission in the union cause attended
with great peril and in which it -was stated that the prisoner
135 Indiana 359.
"Page 238.
2044 Penn. 210.'
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was to be sent through the lines with his brother and a company of telegraph operators where his peculiar talents would
enable him to render valuable service to the federal government
in the pending crisis, and further requested no publicity as it
would defeat the purpose of the mission. The pardon was delivered to the warden, who released the prisoner to the United
States marshal, and, unfortunately for the prisoner, he was accompanied to Washington by the marshal, who learned from
Secretary Stanton and the assistant secretary that the communications were forgeries, whereupon the marshal, on the order of
the governor, returned the prisoner to the warden of the penitentiary. In this case, on habeas corpus, the court held the
pardon was void for fraud under the common law. The court
recognized that the delivery of the pardon to the warden was a
delivery to the prisoner, and expressly decided this case on the
question of fraud presented. The court said: "This pardon is
void because of the false and forged representations and papers
that were used in procuring it from the governor. . .
By
the common law all charters and patents may be avoided if based
on any false suggestion, whether the suggestions be contained in
them or not. . . . Any person may reclaim the rights out if
which he has been cheated, until they come into the hands of a
third person, who is a bona fide purchaser for value, without
notice of the fraud. And so may the Commonwealth.
He has no better title to this pardon than a consignee of goods
would have after the goods had been stopped in transitu, on the
discovery that the sale and delivery had been procured by letters forged by the friends of the consignee."
The only case in which the power of the courts to declare a
pardon void for fraud has been denied is Knapp v. Thomas, decided in 1883. In this case Governor Charles Foster of Ohio
revoked a pardon for fraud and directed the prisoner to be held.
On a writ of habeas corpus a divided court based its decision
upon the point that the pardon could not be called in question
in such a proceeding because it was a collateral attack,
and, after arriving at this conclusion, delivered an exhaustive opinion against the power of the courts to set aside pardons
for fraud as an interference by the judiciary with the prerogative of a co-ordinate branch of the government. There is no
authority for such a position, and it has never been followed,
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and, of this opinion, Bishop in his work on Criminal Law,2 1
says: "A Pardon obtained by a fraud on the pardoning power
is void. In an Ohio habeas corpus case, this proposition was
by the majority of a divided court denied, as applied to a pardon
fully delivered and accepted, and in a proceeding not for its
revocation. A pardon being an act specially in pais, the procuring of It being altogether ex parte, and there being no provision of law for its reversal or for any hearing of persons whose
interests may be prejudiced by it, this Ohio doctrine is most unfortunate and is contrary to the ordinary course of our jurisprudence in analogous things."
When a pardon is presented as a bar to the execution of the
judgment of a court, it has the power to inquire into the validity
of the pardon in the hands of the person who seeks to benefit by
it, and it is upon this theory that it has been repeatedly held
that the courts have the right to determine if those who seek
to avoid the effect of their judgments are lawfully invested with
that right, and this is a mattpr for judicial determination and
peculiarly in the province of the court when the title to the
pardon is questioned by the Commonwealth.
22
In'the latest case on this subject, Rathburn v. BaumeZ,
the majority opinion says: "Are the courts impotent to protect
their judgments from annulment by fraud perpetrated upon
the pardoning power? This is no interference by the judicial
department with the constitutional prerogatives of a co-ordinate
branch of the government. The court is not asked to investigate
or pass upon the motives of the governor in granting the pardon.
No such question is in the case. It is the acts of the appellee,
who is claiming a benefit under the written instrument, that are
the subject of the inquiry. Here we have a situation where a
man duly convicted of crime seeks the annulment of the judgment against him. He has possession of a written instrument
which, if valid, annuls the judgment. It is contended that the
instrument was procured by his own fraud, and is therefore invalid. A court of equity has the power to investigate his title
to such written instrument and to inquire whether or not the
same is valid. This is not an interference with the prerogatives
of the executive. It is merely an inquiry into the rights 'of the
8th Ed., Sec. 905.
191 N. W. 297, 30 A. L. R. 216 (1922).
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party holding such instrument to claim anything thereunder.
The governor mayiissue pardons without let or hindrance on the
part of the judiciary. No inquiry is made in regard to his acts.
But the party seeking to benefit by an official act of the governor
can certainly have his own acts investigated for fraud.
A pardon must be evidenced by a written instrument. It is not
sufficient to vacate and supersede the judgment of a court, for
the executive to orally say to the convict, 'Go, and sin no more.'
A pardon is a deed to the validity of which delivery and acceptance are essential. . . . Can this written instrument, this
deed, be subject to impeachment for fraud in its procurement?
By it, the solemn judgment of a court was, in effect,
vacated and set aside. The party obtained such written instrument by his own fraudulent act, both as to its execution and
delivery. The people of the state have a direct and vital concern in this matter. . . . It is a basic and fundamental
principle of our law that fraud in its procurement vitiates any
written instrument in the hands of him who is guilty of the
fraud. There is no good reason why the same rules do not apply
to a written instrument obtained by fraud upon the governor as
to one obtained by fraud upon a private citizen. . . . If the
instrument was obtained by fraud upon the governor it is in2
valid and void, and no rights can be enforced under it."1 3
In a recent case in one of our circuit courts, a defendant
was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law and by the
judgment a fine and imprisonment for sixty days was imposed;
he executed bond for an appeal, but failed to perfect the appeal,
when a warrant was issued. When arrested he presented and
offered to file a pardon remitting the imprisonment, which recited that executive clemency had been extended on account of
pulmonary tuberculosis. The governor in this case, when the
alleged fraud was discovered, entered an order of revocation on
the executive journal which stated clearly his position, but it
was never contended that the revocation itself was effective to
revoke the pardon. In response to the motion to file the pardon,
the Commonwealth filed a pleading in the criminal proceeding
' 'This doctrine is also recognized in the following cases: Teritory
v. Richardson., 9 Okla. 579 (1900); Ex Parte Rice,.72 Texas C. R. 597
(1913); Ex Parte Ray (Okla.) 193 Pacific 638 (1920); Rossen v. State,
23 Texas C. A. 237 (1887); Ex Parte Redwine (Texas) 236 S. W. 96
(1921); Ex Parte Reno, 66 Mo. 266; 27 American Reports 337.
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attacking the pardon for fraud in its procurement, chiefly on the
ground that the defendant did not have pulmonary or any other
form of tuberculosis. On a writ of prohibition -directed against
the circuit judge the Court of Appeals held the court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter.24 Upon the hearing
by the court a judgment was entered refusing to file the pardon
-because of fraud in its procurement, and from this judgment an
appeal was prosecuted, but before the case was reached, the defendant had served the sixty days, and the case was dismissed
25
as a moot question.
The principle that the decisions settle is that a man can
not profit by his own wrong and the courts will protect their
judgments against fraud. This is not an interference with the
pardoning power of a co-ordinate branch of the government.
They do not investigate the executive acts. They cannot. It is
pertinent, perhaps, to state that in most of the cases the executive has initiated the inquiry, and it is certainly true, and none
will deny, that the executive may, when all the facts are revealed,
before or after a judgment of avoidance, renew his pardon. It
seems axiomatic that if the judgment does not seek to prevent a
renewal of the pardon, or the further exercise of the executive
prerogative in the particular case, certainly there is no interference between the co-ordinate branches of the government. It
limits the executive in no way. The courts do not review the
executive acts; they review the conduct of the man who seeks to
nullify the execution of the judgment of the court by his own
fraud and misrepresentation. A contributor to the April, 1923,
Michigan Law Review, opposes the majority opinion in the
Rathbburn v. Baumet case and the great weight of authority, and
expresses a preference for the conclusions reached by a likewise divided opinion in the Knapp v. Thomas case, on the ground
that it is an interference with the executive, and concludes with
the following citation from the latter case, that "it is far better
that he should escape punishment than that a plain principle
of law should be set at naught," and further the criticism is
made that "it limits the executive's power to pardon in such
cases as where in the court's view the petitioner and his advoHudspeth v. Tracy, 203 Ky. 277.
"Hudspeth v. Comm onwealtt, 204 Ky. 606.
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cates have related to the governor 'the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth.' "
From the opinions and reasoning of the courts we have
seen on the contrary that the court's view does not limit the
executive power and he may do what he chooses after the truth
is revealed and disregard the court's view. There is no conflict. They do not restrict or restrain him.
Will any contend that the courts should stand mute in the
face of fraudl In the Pennsylvania case of forgery, should
Crosse have been released in the face of such deception? There
should be a remedy for the wrong, and on this subject the courts
have overwhelmingly determined that the remedy exists. There
is a difference of opinion-in the courts as to procedure, and it
may be said that in this state a pardon may be attacked when
presented in court and relied upon to enforce rights under it,
which is inferred from the decision in Hudspetlb v. Tracy, where
the jurisdiction of the court was sustained. The questions of
law discussed have been decided on writs of habeas corpus in
some states, in others in direct proceedings to avoid the pardon,
and in others denied where it was viewed as a collateral attack;
but with the execption of the Ohio case (and it was decided
mainly on the latter ground), the authorities are practically in
accord with the view of the law that fraud in its procurement
will vitiate the pard6n.
It is equally well settled that the courts cannot investigate
the validity of a pardon as aected by the particular motives
which actuated the granting power. With the reasons which
actuate the executive in granting pardons, the courts have no
concern. The Constitution of the state gives to the executive this
power and invests in him a wide discretion which may not be
substituted by the opinions of the judiciary; his reasons or purposes are not subject to review, and it has never been the policy
of the courts to inquire into the reasons or purposes which
move the pardoning power. This distinction is clearly defined
in the decisions of the courts, and cannot be misunderstood. In
the Harvard Law Review 26 of June, 1924, is an article dealing
with the power to regulate contempts, and on the question of
separation of powers, the writer says: "As a principle of statesmanship the practical demands of government preclude its
2Vol. 37, No. 8.
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doctrinaire application. The latitude with which the doctrine
must bp observed in a work-a-day world was steadily insisted
upon y those shrewd men of the world who framed the Constitution and by the statesman who became the great chief
justice. A distinguished student of comparative constitutional
law, one of Montesquieu's countrymen, has summed up the
significance of his doctrine: 'The separation of powers is merely
a formula, and formulas are not working principles of government. Montesquieu had chiefly aimed to indicate by his formula
the aspirations of his times and country. He could not and did
not wish to propose a definite and permanent solution of all the
questions brought up by the government of men and their longfelt longings for.fairness and justice.' . . . Nor has it been
treated by the Supreme Court as a technical legal doctrine. From
the beginning that court has refused to draw abstract, analytical
lines of separation and hias recognized necessary areas of intera&tion. Duties have been cast on courts as to which 'Congress
itself might have legislated; matters have been withdrawn from
courts and vested in the executive; laws have been sustained
which are contingent upon executive judgment on highly complicated factors, instead of insisting on self-defining legislation;
even though the 'distinction between amnesty and pardon is of
no practical importance' the specific power of the President to
grant pardons does not invalidate congressional acts of amnesty,
nor does the President's power to pardon offenses preclude Congress from giving the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to
remit fines and forfeitures. Even more significant than the decisions themselves are the considerations which induced them,
and the insistence on an abstract doctrine of separation of
powers which they rejected. . .
The dominant note is
respect for the aqtion of that branch of the government upon
which is cast the primary responsibility for adjusting public
affairs."
A very interesting exercise of the pardon power recently
developed in the United States District Court in Chicago when
the President pardoned one Peter Grossman, who had been committed to jail for contempt of court under the federal prohibition act. On a writ of habeas corpus, it was held that the President could not pardon a contempt of the federal court, and the
same may be true in a contempt of either house of Congress.

274

KENTUc.KY LAw JoURNAL

However, this case is now pending in the Supreme Court of the
United States, and the decision is awaited with interest.
The foregoing is the result of my examination'of the decisions on these points in the trial of the case herein mentioned.
and after a limited review of the authorities, this discussion of
the subject is respectfully submitted for your information and
such consideration as it merits.
ORM S. WARE,
CormmonweaZtlh Attorney.
Covington, Ky.

